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This article returns to the famous encounter between Levinas and the
Heidegger scholar, Jesuit, and Lacanian, Fr. William Richardson in 1962
when Levinas told Richardson of his own suffering as a prisoner of war
in a Nazi camp in 1943. Richardson recounted this incident in his 1993
talk titled "The Irresponsible Subject." Here Richardson makes it clear
that he regarded Levinas's behavior during their encounter as rude and
irresponsible. In this article I analyze Richardson's interpretation of this
incident from the perspective of Levinas's ethical philosophy. How did
Richardson respond when confronted face to face with Levinas's own
radical otherness as a Jewish prisoner of the Nazis and as someone whose
parents and brothers were murdered by the Nazis? Did Richardson testify
to an overwhelming and disorienting sense of ethical responsibility that
made his return to his previous ways of understanding and conceiving
impossible? I argue that though anyone can imagine a Levinasian reaction
to such a revelation of Levinas's own suffering, there is no evidence of
this in Richardson's interpretation of the incident. Rather, Richardson's
essay seems to refute Levinas's ethical philosophy and even performs in
many ways the strong ability of the subject to encounter even radical
otherness, reduce it to more of the same, and return to itself securely
and completely.

Emannuel Levinas,
Fr. William Richardson,
and the Return of the
Irresponsible Subject
Robert Manning
Quincy University

KEYWORDS: Levinas, responsibility, William Richardson

Did you hear the one about Levinas meeting
at a party a Jesuit, a Heideggerian, and a
Lacanian? This might sound like a joke, but
what it refers to, of course, is really quite serious: the famous, perhaps infamous, encounter in 1962 between Levinas and Father
William Richardson, a noted Heideggerian
scholar, Jesuit priest, and Lacanian psychanalyst. What we know about this encounter we
know entirely through Richardson’s perspective. He recounted the incident some thirty
years later during the talk he gave at the first
conference in America devoted to Levinas’
work, in Chicago in 1993, a talk to which he
gave the provocative title, “The Irresponsible
Subject.” Probably none of us who were there
and heard Richardson’s talk have forgotten
it. We haven’t forgotten what Levinas report-
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edly said to Richardson during that encounter so long ago, and we have not forgotten
what Richardson said about Levinas during
that talk. After all, Richardson made clear in
that talk that to him the irresponsible subject
was Levinas himself, who was explosive and
violent. Now who could forget that?
In this paper I return to that fascinating, unforgettable, perhaps troubling
double event to look more closely at both of
its sides: First, Richardson’s account of that
encounter with Levinas in 1962 when Levinas
reportedly directly spoke to Richardson
in the first person about his own suffering
and the suffering of his parents. Secondly,
Richardson’s own rather astounding interpretation of that encounter some thirty years
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later in his talk and subsequent essay titled
“The Irresponsible Subject.” In this paper
I analyze Richardson’s interpretation of that
event through the lens of Levinas’ own radical philosophy about ethical responsibility to
the Other.1
Before we get to the details of the encounter in 1962 we should point out one important
thing about Levinas that is nearly incontestable:
Levinas does not like to talk about Levinas. He
almost never talks about himself and he even
avoids using the first person singular. In his
major philosophical works he studiously
avoids the use of the first person. Even in
Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (1978),
where he insistently states the same powerful
argument over and over again, he never says
“I argue” or “I maintain”. His never making
I statements in his philosophical work is
rather astounding considering Levinas is
a very argumentative philosopher and is
nearly always making strong and powerful
arguments. His avoidance of I statements is
perhaps most glaringly obvious in the short
autobiographical account from 1963 titled
Signature (Levinas, 1990). Who else but Levinas
would write even a short autobiography
without employing even once the first person? And I do believe that it is important to
observe and contemplate the fact that even in
the most important, most cited, and probably most revealing one sentence Levinas ever
wrote about himself and his life, even here
he did not speak in the first person. After
listing several events in his life without using
the I he says of his biography that one most
important and most cited line: “It is dominated by the presentiment and the memory
of the Nazi horror” (1990, p. 291). I-saying is
simply not Levinas’s style.

1
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even say traumatic, if we remember Levinas’s
constant employment of that word in
Otherwise Than Being and the ethical meaning
he gives to it. So much of what Levinas says
about trauma, about ethical responsibility,
time, anarchy, in that tortured and tortuous
text, Otherwise Than Being, could have become
crystallized in that definitely dramatic, possibly traumatic encounter wherein Levinas
says I. To say the least, this could have been
for Richardson a stunning, even to use one
of so many metaphors from Otherwise Than
Being, a dizzying realization of the otherness
to him of Levinas’s own life and own tragic
experiences and suffering.

Remembering Levinas’s strong aversion
to using the first person singular, to saying I,
we turn or we return to that famous incident
where Levinas uses or at least is reported
as using the I. What brought Levinas and
Richardson together at the party was the
celebration of Richardson’s doctoral defense
in 1962 at the Catholic University of Leuven.
Levinas as a scholar of both Husserl and
Heidegger served as an examiner. The famous
encounter takes place not at the defense
but afterward, at the party, the celebration
of Richardson’s great day. As Richardson
recounts in his essay, he was at the party
politely greeting people, thanking them for
coming, when all of a sudden, he says, “I
felt a very vigorous poke on my shoulder
from someone who came up from behind”
(1995, p. 125). It was Levinas. Richardson
says he was delighted to see him, despite
the poke apparently, and warmly reached
out his hand in gratitude, a friendly gesture
Levinas ignored. Levinas looked straight at
him and said: “I was talking with some old
friends, regaling them with stories, had
them all laughing. I thought you might
want to know what they were laughing at.”
Sure, says Richardson. Then Levinas asked
Richardson if he remembers where in his
book he describes 1943 as a “prolific year”
for Heidegger? Richardson says he does and
Levinas right at that moment let him have
it: “In 1943 my parents were in one concentration camp and I was in another. It was a
very prolific year, indeed.” At that point,
Richardson tells us, Levinas “turned on his
heels and walked away. He was gone” (1995,
p. 125).2

Levinas’s I-saying here could have
caused Richardson to freeze in his tracks,
another metaphor from Otherwise Than Being.
How could 1943 be so different for Levinas,
for his parents, as it was for Heidegger or for
him? How could he have written about 1943
without thinking about the immense amount
of suffering being borne by millions of people at that time? Did he? Forced to confront
Levinas’s suffering and that of his parents, he
could have felt the entire weight of injustice as
somehow--quite unfairly but real at the same
time--as his responsibility. He could have
felt responsibility for suffering he himself

2

What a moment! What an encounter!
What an I-saying! How dramatic! We might

See Richardson’s essay in Ethics As First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas for
Philosophy, Literature, and Religion, ed. Adriaan Peperzak (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1995), pp. 123-31.
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could not possibly have caused and then
truly had to grapple with the heavy weight
of what Levinas calls over and over again in
Otherwise Than Being anarchy, the anarchical
nature of ethical responsibility, that begins
somehow before your own time. Of course
since Richardson was a Catholic priest and
Levinas and his parents were Jewish, this
anarchical ethical responsibility could have
opened time itself far beyond 1943 or even
all the years of Nazism, war, and Holocaust.
He could have felt the entire weight of centuries of Christian hatred of and violence
toward Jews as somehow his responsibility.
Of course how could he be responsible for
Christian violence toward Jewish communities centuries before he was born? And
yet the anarchical nature of ethical responsibility presses down on the self sometimes
making it hard to breathe, as if somehow
all the victims from the past are inside your
own skin, as Levinas says in Otherwise Than
Being. All this incredible vocabulary of this
powerful, second great work of Levinas, with
its recurrent metaphors that evoke suffering
and even violence so much that Paul Ricoeur
famously and rightly called them “verbal terrorism”, could have struck Richardson as he
thought about this encounter for years and
wrote about it thirty years later (Ricoeur, 2004,

It is important to note that this is Richardson’s second recounting of this incident and that this second
one is very different from the first account. In the much earlier account, in 1965, Levinas simply says that
in 1943 “I was in one of the concentration camps” and makes no reference to his parents. Why the different versions and which one is what Levinas actually said? These are important questions perhaps never
to be fully answered. It is highly likely that Levinas’s parents and brothers along with the great majority of
the Jewish community of Kaunas or Kovno were murdered in or very near Kaunas in the early, “Holocaust
by bullets” phase in the horrible summer and fall of 1941. It is possible, though highly unlikely, that
Levinas believed in 1962 that his parents were alive and in a camp in 1943. I find it much more likely
that Richardson’s own memory of the conversation changed over the decades. Levinas's son Michael
recently publicly opposed the founding of a center in Kaunas named in honor of Levinas since his father
and his children were aware that their family had been murdered by German soldiers and by Lithuanian
partisans in the “Shoah par balles” and that Levinas had vowed never to return either to Germany or to
Lithuania because of the massacre of his birth family. I discuss traces of this Holocaust by bullets horror
in Levinas's philosophy in an article forthcoming later this year in The Journal of Holocaust and Genocide Studies. Adam Newton discusses Richardson's earlier version as well as his reactions to hearing
Richardson in 1993 in his 2001 book The Fence and the Neighbor. I thank the fine Levinas scholar Oona
Ajzenstat for reminding me of these passages in Newton's book.
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p. 84).

Could Richardson have felt that all
these suffering others had a hold on him
that could be described as traumatic? Could
he have felt taken hostage by these ethical
responsibilities beyond his own time and
his own choosing? Could he have felt these
responsibilities as an invasion of his very self,
as an absolute exposure to the outside, even
as an “exposure of exposedness” as Levinas
says in Otherwise Than Being? Could he have
felt no escape, no way out of these responsibilities, like Adam in the garden when God
comes looking, to employ yet another metaphor from Otherwise Than Being? Could he
have felt all these inescapable ethical responsibilities as an obsession? Could he have even
felt all these anarchical, unchosen ethical
responsibilities to all these others inside his
own skin as a persecution? All these extreme
and tortuous metaphors from Otherwise
Than Being could have come to Richardson-who was, after all, a good and close reader
of Otherwise Than Being--as he thought about
for many years his amazing encounter with
Levinas when Levinas said I.
This dramatic encounter with Levinas
and his I-saying could have been traumatic
for Richardson in precisely the ethical meaning of that term as Levinas develops it in
Otherwise Than Being. It could have provoked
within Richardson what Levinas calls in
Otherwise Than Being “the denucleation of the
ego,” where the center of the self is broken
up, hollowed out, forever disturbed, unable
to return to itself as it was, always prevented
from returning by these inescapable and
anarchical ethical responsibilities that make
the return to self, Levinas claims, impossible, a continual delay, an inevitable deferral.
Inescapable ethical responsibilities beyond
the self’s own choosing, willing, even beyond
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the self’s own time make the self’s return
to itself, as Levinas says, “an interminable
detour.3
We have no idea how Richardson reacted
to Levinas’s I-saying immediately after their
dramatic encounter in 1962. Did Richardson
then feel the encounter as a traumatic hold
on him that brought down upon him like an
avalanche all the hyperbolic and even terroristic vocabulary of anarchical responsibility
that Levinas articulates in Otherwise Than
Being? We cannot say. We have nothing from
Richardson from that time. What we do have
is the talk Richardson gave at the conference
in 1993 and the essay version published in 1995
with the title “The Irresponsible Subject.” So
does this essay follow the Levinasian script
from Otherwise Than Being we have just imaginatively put forth? Does he testify to the traumatic ethical hold provoked in him by the
I-saying of Levinas’s radical otherness? Does
he describe his own Otherwise Than Being-like
dizzying and disorienting sense of ethical
responsibility beyond his own willing and
choosing? Does he talk about how the overwhelming sense of anarchical ethical responsibility emptied out the ego, interrupted
any attempt to return to himself, made this
return impossible, made every return an
interminable detour? Is this what happened
when Levinas not only met but confronted,
face to face, a Jesuit, Heideggerian, and a
Lacanian at a party and--so rarely for him-spoke his own I of suffering?
Nothing, actually, could be further
from the truth. Despite the Otherwise Than
Being script one can easily imagine for this
psychoanalytic reader of both Totality and
Infinity and Otherwise Than Being, there is
in Richardson’s essay no evidence of this

See the important late essay on the way to OTB titled “No Identity” in Collected Philosophical Papers of
Emmanuel Levinas (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 149.
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whatsoever. Indeed, if the essay shows anything it shows that the subject even when
it is addressed in a radical way by radical
otherness, can quite easily fend off that radical otherness, absorb it back into the same,
and return to itself quite easily and securely.
It is almost as if in recalling this encounter
and writing about it in his own way, on his
own terms, he is enacting a radical refusal
of Levinas’s hyperbolic, anarchical ethical
responsibility and enacting and putting on
display the self’s strong power--even in the
face of radical alterity--to return to itself
securely, comfortingly, and completely.
There are several ways in which
Richardson in his essay both refutes Levinas’s
radical ethics and returns safely to himself. No
interminable delay for him! I will analyze several ways in which this return to subject/self
happens in the essay. Some of them are quite
astonishing, and in some ways even alarming,
haunting. I will start with the central and the
most important way in which the return to
the subject happens. This central way or path
of return involves Richardson’s own view of
the main point or issue he needs to analyze,
come to understand, in the Levinas story he
recounts. What is it in this encounter with
Levinas he remembers from so many years
ago, what is it that calls for thinking, to use
the language of Heidegger? Is it something
to do with Levinas’s I-saying of his radical
alterity? With Levinas’s suffering and that
of his family? Not at all. Richardson makes
absolutely clear what this incident calls him
to think about. The matter for thinking here
is perfectly obvious: how could Levinas, the
great philosopher of ethical responsibility to
other people, possibly have been so rude to
him? “My question is,” says Richardson, “who
did that?” and by that he says he means the
entire drama “beginning with the poke on
the back down to the turning away” (1995,
p. 125). The matter that calls for thinking is:
who is “this angry man?” Who is this ethical
philosopher who had been so courteous to

him as an examiner at the defense and now
was this rude and angry man? There seems to
be, Richardson says, “two dimensions in the
same person.” How in the world do we think
the “discrepancy” between the two dimensions within Levinas? That is the central question that must be thought here! Lucky for all
of us that Richardson is not only a Heidegger
scholar but a Lacanian psychoanalyst so he
is well equipped to explain what he calls the
“eruption” of Levinas’s unconscious on that
day at that very moment. The eruption of the
unconscious explains those two dimensions
Levinas showed by being both so kind and so
rude on that day, the ethical philosopher of
the Other and also the irresponsible subject
at the same time. Levinas’s direct I-saying on
that day prompts Richardson to return to
his Lacanian self so placidly and completely:
“what better way can we find to explain the
discrepancy between the two dimensions
we have seen of the one Emmanuel Levinas
than the psychoanalytic one I am suggesting,
which accepts the hypothesis of an irresponsible subject?” (1995, p. 129).
Another way in which Richardson
enacts the comforting return to self is when
he wonders what exactly upset Levinas so
much at that moment? Could it be horrible
memories of his own camp experiences or
horrible images of a much more horrible
place where his parents were when they
were murdered or the bitterness Levinas
expressed in 1955 when he stated about the
era of the Nazi horror that “the world has
learned nothing and forgotten everything”?
(1990, p 147). Oh, heavens no! It was the word
prolific that got to him. The unconscious is
structured like a language, he reminds us, and
Levinas’s reaction was “so explosive” because
“the unconscious functions like that, through
the power of words.” It was the word ‘prolific’
that “threw him into a skid” (1995, p. 125).
Fortunately, Richardson has already told us
that he didn’t mean anything by that word
and was just trying to choose among busy,
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productive, etc., and thought to himself at
the time: “How about prolific..Let’s go with
it and get on with it.” He could never have
imagined such a simple choice of words
would cause “the residual anger of many years
[to] descend on the head of a young man,” but
that is of course, as Richardson reminds us,
how the unconscious works!
Another obvious way Richardson
returns to himself so comfortingly is his treatment here of the huge issue of Heidegger’s
Nazism. Richardson does not use the word
Nazism but refers to Heidegger’s “political
involvement,” which he says was “shattering”
to Levinas. But what exactly is “shattering” to Levinas about Heidegger’s political
involvement? Was it that Heidegger never
renounced Nazism? That he still supported it
and publicly wore the swastika in, say, 1943?
That he never made a statement definitively
condemning the Nazi genocide against the
Jewish communities of Europe? No. What
was shattering to Levinas, according to
Richardson, was “the debacle of 1933” (1995,
p. 126). With those few words Richardson
returns to that comforting view put forward
by Heidegger himself that his support for
Hitler was an 11-month blunder so early in
the Nazi era. And who in 1995 could still
believe that? And yet that is the comforting
view Richardson somehow is able to return
to here even in this essay that enables him
to think what it was that was “shattering” to
Levinas about Heidegger’s “political involvement” even as he recounts his face to face
personal encounter with Heidegger’s most
powerful Jewish critic who tells him quite
directly of his own suffering.
Yet another way in which Richardson is
able to return to himself in a comforting way
is what he says here about Levinas’s view of
violence. He explains that at the time of their
encounter he took Levinas’s rudeness and
anger not only as an “unnecessary act of violence,” but as violence “as he uses that term.”
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While it is possible that in Levinasian terms
rudeness and anger in certain circumstances
could be considered violence, Levinas thinks
violence not in one way but in so many
different ways that Oona Ajzenstat wisely
writes of the “violences upon violences”
throughout his work (Ajzenstat, 2001, p. 317).
What is more, certainly the most frequent
and most important way he thinks violence is
through real physical violence, as in murder.
The very face, he says over and over again,
calls me to nonviolence while at the same
time tempting me to murder, inciting in
me the desire to murder. There are actually
several striking passages in Levinas’s masterful early work, Totality and Infinity, about
murder. To cite only one: “Murder, at the
origin of death, reveals a cruel world, but one
to the scale of human relations” (1969, p. 236).
But here Richardson gives himself a radically
reduced version of Levinas’s complex and
frequently haunted language about violence
that is comforting to him. Levinas’s own philosophy conceives of violence not through all
the horrors and murders happening, say, in
1943, but in terms of what Levinas actually
did to him. Richardson gives himself a view
of Levinas on violence that returns him to his
own comforting view that what Levinas did
to him with that powerful I-saying at that
party was not just rude but “an unnecessary
act of violence as he uses that term.”
The last two ways we will discuss that
Richardson is able to return to himself are
inter-related. They are probably the most
astonishing, troubling, perhaps even haunting ways. They are perhaps the most revealing
of the subject’s ability to encounter even radical, painful difference and still fend it off and
return to itself. These two inter-related ways
or paths of return occur when Richardson
discusses Levinas’s parents and when he discusses anti-Semitism.
Remember that this entire incident at
the party Richardson is recounting involves
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Levinas I-saying and talking, very unusually,
about himself and his parents. Levinas, of
course, according to Richardson in 1993 mentioned his parents in a concentration camp in
1943 during the horror years of the Holocaust.
Richardson’s interest in his parents, however,
lies elsewhere: “What his early relations with
his mother and father were like, I have no
idea–all pertinent psychoanalytic questions
remain unanswered” (1995, p. 126). So when
Richardson turns to the topic of Levinas’
parents, the only way he can think this is to
return to psychoanalytic questions about the
family dynamics, a return that enables him
at the same time to turn away from what
Levinas himself has just told him about his
parents: their suffering as Jews in a camp
during the year of horror of 1943. If Levinas
had actually said or written something about
his relations with them, that could have given
Richardson something to which to turn his
attention. What Levinas is actually telling
him, something about his parents’ suffering
before they were murdered, which he surely
knows about when he writes the essay since
Levinas of course dedicated Otherwise Than
Being to his murdered parents, brothers, and
in-laws, and to the millions of other victims
of Nazi anti-Semitism, Richardson simply
does not turn to or make a matter for thinking, not even for a second.
Even more astonishing, perhaps even
more disturbing, is what Richardson says
when he turns to the question of Levinas’s
life and anti-Semitism, how he even with this
topic manages the return to self. He says of
Levinas’s life: “I am aware of no anecdotes,
such as we have in the case of Freud, that tell
of any concrete experiences of anti-Semitism”
(1995, p. 126). Presumably, Richardson here is
calling back to himself specific incidents of
anti-Semitic prejudice and hostility Freud
recounts in his 1924 “Autobiographical Study.”
Freud’s statements about anti-Semitic incidents he experienced and that Richardson
is already familiar with are what count as

“concrete anti-Semitic experiences” and since
Levinas does not recount similar experiences
in the way Freud does Richardson can say,
astonishing nearly everyone, “I am aware of
no anecdotes. . .of any concrete experiences
of anti-Semitism” in Levinas’s life. He is
able to say this about a person who has told
him personally about his own experiences
in a Nazi concentration camp and told him
personally about his parents’ being in a Nazi
concentration camp. He has said this about a
person whose parents, brothers, in-laws, and
countless other relatives and friends were
murdered in the Holocaust and who would
certainly have been murdered by the Nazis
had they won the war. But all this doesn’t
count as concrete anti-Semitic experiences.
Because Levinas’s experiences are not like the
anti-Semitic experience Freud recounts and
that Richardson is already familiar with, he
can return to his comforting view of Levinas’s
life. Richardson’s return to self and the self’s
ability to fend off even Levinas’s radical
otherness is so complete that he can say of
Levinas, this philosopher whose personal
history is so filled with violence and suffering
that he has rightly been called a prophet of
the murdered people: “I am aware of no anecdotes . . . that tell of any concrete experiences
of anti-Semitism.”
In the years after that 1962 encounter
with Richardson in Leuven, Levinas would
go on to describe the ethical relation with
otherness even more radically than he did in
Totality and Infinity. He would go on to write
a text so insistent about its argument about
the anarchical nature of ethical responsibility
that makes the return to self an impossible
detour so dramatically, with such power and
urgency, that Susan Handelman calls the
text “battering” (1991, p. 342). Terry Velers
compares it to “a red hot iron.” (2014, p. 87).
Levinas also in this incredible second major
text, Otherwise Than Being, employs that
ominously terroristic, as Ricouer says, vocabulary almost entirely absent from Totality
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and Infinity, a vocabulary super-charged
with echoes or traces of violence if not even
horror: hostage, exposure, obsession, trauma,
other in one’s skin, persecution. He also gave
this extraordinary text an extraordinary
dedication, dedicated at once to “those who
were closest among the six million” and to all
people murdered by “the same hatred of the
other man, the same anti-Semitism.” Then in
Hebrew, even more personally, the individual names of those closest to him who were
murdered by the Nazis, the names of his parents, his two brothers, and his wife’s parents.
This dedication in this very different, second
major work is certainly the most powerful
I-saying Levinas ever gave all us, though of
course he did not use the I.
What happened when Levinas met a
Jesuit, Heideggerian, and Lacanian psychoanalyst at a party in 1962? That might be the
joke, but it is not really the question. The
question is: what happened to Richardson
when he encountered not only the Levinas
of 1962 who had just published Totality and
Infinity but also the even more radical Levinas
of Otherwise Than Being, the Levinas of anarchy, hostage, trauma, obsession, persecution,
and of that moving, mournful dedication?
What happened when Richardson grappled
with not only his party memories of Levinas
but also with the Levinas of Totality and
Infinity and even of Otherwise Than Being?
Was Richardson’s encounter with these multiple Levinases traumatic for him in the way
Levinas uses the word trauma in Otherwise
Than Being?
If we return to Richardson’s talk (which
I heard and have never forgotten) at that
great conference in 1993 and to his 1995 essay
with that question in mind, the answer you
come to is a rather definitive no. Somehow
no. Despite the torrent of insistent, battering
rhetoric that is Otherwise Than Being about
the subject’s anarchic responsibilities beyond
one’s own choosing, even beyond one’s own

9

time that interrupt the subject’s return to
itself and make it impossible, a continual
detour, the self actually has an amazing ability to fend off the potentially challenging
nature even of radical otherness and to return
to itself. Richardson’ essay about that famous
encounter with Levinas puts on display this
amazing power of the self to return to itself
in an absolutely fascinating, sometimes
astounding, perhaps even frightening way.
That amazing ability of the self to
encounter radical otherness and not experience vertigo, shock, absolute exposure,
interruption, denucleation, and to be able
to reduce otherness to more of the same and
to return to itself, that is what Richardson’s
essay depicts rather perfectly. And isn’t that
reducing power of the self to fend off radical
otherness and return complacently to itself,
isn’t that what Levinas, even before Totality
and Infinity and all the way through it and all
the way to Otherwise Than Being and beyond,
is always writing about, is always warning us
about?
The journey beyond the self to genuine encounter with genuine otherness
is Abraham’s journey out with no return,
what Levinas calls “an absolute adventure”
(1969, p. 305). But he always contrasts this
with the journey of Odysseus, the journey without adventure, not the journey
out but the journey whose point is always
to return. Even in “Ethics and Spirit” in
1952 he warns us that The Odyssey with
its journey home dominates western literature because “ultimately the West discovers the universe within itself” (1990,
p. 10). In Totality and Infinity he tells us that
Abraham’s journey out, that genuine encounter with genuine otherness, does not happen
automatically. The self has to be opened
to the adventure: we realize the relation to
the other “only in the measure we effect it.
. . Alterity is possible only starting from me”
(p. 40). Again, remarkably, “Only an I can
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respond to the injunction of a face” (p. 305).
But Levinas also says over and over again
that the self does not so much as have but
is a power to refuse the absolute adventure
and remain at home, to reduce all otherness
to more of the same, and live in such a way
that all journeys are journeys home. The self
can “suspend” the alterity of the encounter
with the other. In a world in which I resist
adventure and merely sojourn home, “alterity
falls under my powers” (p. 38). I can return
to myself so completely, Levinas warns us,
that the alterity of the other “vanishes” (p.
42). At this point, Levinas tells us in Totality
and Infinity, “the shock of the encounter with
the other is deadened” (p. 42). This dead life,
this refusal of absolute adventure, this journey home, this return to self, is what Levinas
is always warning us about. Sometimes he
calls it the reduction of the other to more
of the same, sometimes he calls it totality,
sometimes he refers to it as a very negative
freedom that “denotes remaining the same in
the midst of the other” (p. 45). Sometimes he
refers to it as violence, sometimes tyranny,
and sometimes he calls it “the imperialism of
the same” (p. 39).

I have come to think of Richardson’s
unforgettable talk and his essay for myself,
and perhaps only for myself, as the return
of the irresponsible subject. Levinas may
have thought them, the talk and the essay,
Levinas perhaps may even have felt them,
as potentially violent moments in the
always unfolding history of the imperialism of the same.
The continuing history of the imperialism
of the same is a fitting way to understand what
Newton rightly called the “haunting afterlife”
of Richardson’s talk in the form of Charles
Scott’s offensive “Letter to Bill Richardson”
published in the Festschrift volume in honor
of Richardson in 1995 (Newton, 2001, p. 3).
Here Scott applauds Richardson for the way
he employed his “hard, psychological investigation and judgment” to Levinas’s rude actions
at that party, that “disconcerting occurrence of
everyday psychopathology.” This Scott relates
to original sin, and he believes Richardson was
relating this to original sin as well in his essay,
but Levinas just couldn’t or wouldn’t understand this basic truth about all of us. By relating
Levinas’s actions at the party to original sin,
Scott says, Richardson was suggesting:

We have no idea how Richardson
responded at the time to Levinas’ I-saying
directly to him, face to face, in 1962, or what
it did to him, inside him. We will never
know. All we know is Richardson’s famous or
infamous talk in 1993 and his essay two years
later. We can see so clearly in the essay so many
ways Richardson’s brilliant mind and all of its
considerable powers of conceptuality enabled
him to resist, fend off and deaden the otherness of Levinas even when Levinas—so rare for
him—spoke his I directly. Richardson’s amazing
cognitive ability to do that brings him safely
and securely home in so many ways. And in so
many ways, Richardson does, performs in the
talk and the essay, exactly what Levinas in so
many ways over so many years and across so
many texts has warned us about.

an opening beyond the limits of such
judgment, an openness to a fallenness
from God that cuts through all of our
lives and gives them definite division
from the Source of life and redemption.
This fallenness can be experienced as a
kind of madness, a living despair that
cannot recognize itself in its own enactment, particularly in the enactments
that seem wise and good and responsible. I took you to be suggesting that no
one, including Levinas, could eliminate
the error that seams our lives and that
we need reference to something beyond
what Levinas can think to account
for his and our lapse: his lapse opened
beyond what he could see and perhaps
beyond what he was willing to know
(2001, pp. 2-3).
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That Levinas’s rare I-saying at a party in
1962 could lead to Richardson’s 1993 talk
and subsequent paper, where he performs so
thoroughly the return to self in so many ways,
is remarkable, and perhaps even haunting
enough. That it then provokes another brilliant philosophical mind to read all of this
through the Christian concept of original
sin which the stubborn Jew Levinas cannot,
perhaps will not know, this is perhaps more
more of the same, more return of the irresponsible subject, than one can bear. Can we
never free ourselves from the history of the
imperialism of the same?
Perhaps the entire adventure of the
present essay, from Levinas’s I-saying in 1962
to Richardson’s talk and essay and Scott’s
Letter, shows us something about why in
the past thirty years or so there has been
such an incredible, overwhelming turn to
Levinas’s ethical philosophy of otherness. We
need his philosophy more than ever, need to
read it well and internalize its radicality, if
we are ever to escape this horrible history of
the imperialism of the same, a history which
Levinas, more than anyone else, has helped us
to understand.

Ajzenstat, O. (2001). Driven Back to the Text.
Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.
Handelman, S. (1991) Fragments of Redemption.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Levinas, E. (1978). Otherwise Than Being or Beyond
Essence. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Levinas, E. (1990). Difficult Freedom. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and Infinity. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne University Press.
Newton, A. (2001). The Fence and the Neighbor.
Albany: SUNY Press.
Richardson, W. (1995). “The Irresponsible Subject” in
Ethics as First Philosophy, ed. Adriaan Peperzak.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp.
123-31.
Ricoeur, P. (2004). “Otherwise: A Reading of Levinas’
Otherwise Than Being” in Yale French Studies
No. 104, pp. 82-99.
Velers, T. (2014). For You Alone. Eugene: Cascade
Books.

11

MIDDLE VOICES VOL. II

ROBERT MANNING

12

